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ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Defendants strongly object to Plaintiffs' attempts to 
"reframe" the issues which Defendants, as Appellants, have 
presented to this Court. Plaintiffs complain that the statement 
of Defendants' issues on appeal is "imprecise" and "incomplete" 
because Defendants refuse to subscribe to Plaintiffs' 
exaggerated, puffing version of the evidence. 
The issues raised in this appeal are legal issues — not 
factual challenges based upon an insufficiency of evidence. We 
have marshalled objectively and fairly all of that evidence 
relevant to determine the issues of law presented by Defendants 
for this Court's review. Plaintiffs wish to "reframe" the issues 
only because they would have this appeal be something other than 
what it is. 
Apparently recognizing that this Court's review of 
Defendants' issues is plenary and without deference to the 
trial court's erroneous rulings, Plaintiffs have attempted to 
manipulate and alter the scope and purpose of the appeal by 
fabricating "straw" issues of fact. After dressing up these 
"straw" dummies, Plaintiffs then attack them as though these 
dummy issues had been created by Defendants. 
Appellants who seek review of claims and issues raised and 
preserved in the trial court possess the prerogative to frame 
these issues to be decided as they choose, regardless of 
appellees' vain efforts to alter those issues. Yee v. City of 
Escondido, 112 S.Ct. 1522, 1532 (1992). Appellants control the 
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scope of the questions presented and may frame them as broadly 
or as narrowly as seems fitting. Id. And, the facts stated and 
the arguments argued in Appellants' brief are properly within the 
framework of Appellants' issues. 
Simply restating the issues as we have framed them, the 
trial court erred as a matter of law when it refused to enforce 
the clear and unambiguous release provisions of the Redemption 
Agreement, which released all known and unknown claims between 
the parties. Plaintiffs attempt to convert this issue into a 
factual maze by claiming fraudulent inducement of the Redemption 
Agreement, arguing that there was no intent to release the 
instant claims. As shown in Appellants' Brief, and admitted by 
Plaintiffs, there is no evidence that, during the partnership, 
Defendants ever said anything regarding the nature and 
construction of the pavilion crypts, or otherwise acted to 
fraudulently induce the settlement release. 
The trial court erred as a matter of law when it allowed 
Plaintiffs' unrestricted reference to and evidence of Defendants' 
financial condition and wealth. Had there been any desire on the 
part of the trial court to accord Defendants fundamental fairness 
and due process at the trial, that court would have followed the 
mandates of Utah Code Ann. Section 78-18-1(2) (1992) and required 
a finding of liability before allowing such irrelevant and 
prejudicial information to be repeatedly stressed and paraded 
before the jury. 
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Additionally, Defendants charge that the award of nearly two 
million dollars in punitive damages is excessive and results from 
the jury's passion and prejudice. That passion and prejudice has 
been consistently injected into this case by the trial court's 
rulings and by Plaintiffs' supercilious, venomous hyperbole. 
We submit that Appellants, and not Plaintiffs, have properly 
framed the issues in this appeal for this Court's review. This 
Court should not be dissuaded from the legitimate issues by 
Plaintiffs' "non-issues." 
STATEMEMT QF FACTS 
While purporting to "marshal" the evidence, Plaintiffs' 
Appellees' Brief persists in taking unwarranted liberties in its 
representations and recharacterization of the evidence, which 
are frequently unsupportable by the record. Appellees' brief is 
rife throughout with unsupported overstatement and inappropriate 
personal attack. We submit that Appellants' statement of facts 
is objective and responsible, whereas Plaintiffs appear bent on 
vindictive destruction. 
As we have noted, this appeal focuses upon legal issues and 
not upon the fanciful characterizations advanced by Plaintiffs. 
Even though these mischaracterizations are not relevant to the 
issues herein, we do respond briefly in this reply brief. Only 
a few of Appellees' creative impressions can be discussed here. 
Plaintiffs consistently over-embellish, and create "red-
herrings," such as captiously referring to the pavilion crypts 
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as stacked, flimsy crates.1 If such emotional impressions are 
indicative of Plaintiffs' view of the evidence, then such view 
is neither circumspect nor caredible. As shown by the following 
examples, this Court must cautiously review the trial transcript 
before placing any credence in the mischaracterizations and 
misimpressions that pervade Plaintiffs' brief, 
THE OUTDOOR CRYPTS WERE NOT MISREPRESENTED 
TO GOVERNMENT1 OFFICIALS OR OTHERS. 
Plaintiffs falsely claim that architect Fluckiger originally 
designed concrete crypts for the outdoor pavilions; and, that Mr. 
Garner secured a construction permits only on that basis, but 
then furtively concealed from the government, and others, that 
the crypts were made of wood rather than concrete., (Appellees' 
Brief at 6-9). However, as shown by an objective view of the 
record, local government approval of the outdoor pavilion 
building plans was never dependent upon the use of concrete, 
nor was anyone deceived when wood crypts were built. 
-^No one at trial ever referred to the pavilion crypts as 
"flimsy" or "stacked crates." We submit that the evidence does 
not support the characterization overemphasized in Appellees' 
brief (e.g. pp. 42, 55). 
Although seemingly trivial, another typical example of 
overstatement is Plaintiffs' mischaracterization of Dr. Burtis 
Evans as Garner's "life-long" physician and study companion 
(Appellees' Brief at 57). Dr. Evans did not even become 
acquainted with Keith Garner until the 1970s - well after 
Alldredge's "mission." (Tr. IX:4648; Exh. 34). Such minor 
collateral misrepresentations are so plentiful throughout 
Appellees' brief that they unavoidably detract from its 
credibility. 
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Initially, in 1982, two years before the garden pavilions 
were contemplated, architect Fluckiger designed a second-story 
addition proposed for the indoor mausoleum building. That 
addition was never constructed. (Tr. 111:3359-66, 3411A). 
Because of the size of such an addition, the building code 
required that construction be entirely of noncombustible 
material. (Tr. Ill:3411A-12). At a 1982 variance hearing on 
this addition for that add-on, indoor mausoleum structure, Mr. 
Fluckiger submitted a brochure that described pre-cast concrete 
crypts, or "DUWE" brand crypts. (Tr. 111:3378; IV:3426; Exh. 
45). That hearing had nothing whatever to do with the later-
designed outdoor garden pavilions. 
Two years later, in the spring of 1984, Fluckiger helped 
obtain a separate variance from the Salt Lake City Board of 
Adjustment to build the outdoor pavilions. The construction 
material for the outdoor crypts was never discussed with the 
Board. (Tr. 111:3410). The minutes of the Board's variance 
hearing for the outdoor pavilions do not mention any material 
with which those outdoor crypts were to be constructed. (Exh. 
44). The only design document submitted by Defendants to Salt 
Lake City in connection with obtaining variance approval was the 
site plan, a preliminary version of what later became Exhibit 47. 
(Tr. 111:3384, 3403-04). 
After the variance was approved, Fluckiger later prepared 
other "design" drawings which were submitted with the application 
for a building permit. (Exhs. 47-50; Tr. 111:3386-88, 3404). 
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Unlike the earlier indoor addition project, these 1984 
drawings of the outdoor pavilions only detailed the design of the 
exterior shells of the five pavilions. (Tr. IV:3434). The 
drawings do not purport to detail the interior structure and 
crypts within the shell, except generally to indicate their 
configuration. (Tr. 111:3390, 3404). 
The pavilion crypts were actually designed in 1985 by the 
contractor, Robert Ord. Contrary to Plaintiffs' claim, Mr. Ord 
did not "depart'' from any architect's "plan" when he employed 
wood in the crypts' construction at Mr. Garner's request. 
Appellees' Brief at 8. (Tr. IV:3518, 3527-28, 3530). 
On his pavilion shell drawing, Exh. 49, Mr. Fluckiger had 
noted "cone, crypts," merely as a holdover assumption from 
his earlier design work on the abandoned plan for the indoor 
addition. However, he had never been asked by Mr. Garner to 
design the crypts inside the pavilion shells or to specify their 
construction material. (Tr. 111:3393, 3404, 3410-11A). Mr. 
Fluckiger never discussed with Mr. Garner the material to be used 
for the pavilion crypts. Id. These two "cryptic" words were 
never intended by Mr. Fluckiger, or by Defendants, to represent 
to Salt Lake City personnel the crypts' construction. (Tr. 
IV:3436). 
Nor was the drawing so treated by Salt Lake City personnel. 
Roger Evans, Director of Building and Housing Services for Salt 
Lake City, testified that in approving, or later revoking, the 
building permit for the outdoor pavilions, no reliance or 
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consideration was placed on any drawing description of concrete 
crypts. (Tr. VIII:4431-32). Building the pavilion crypts out of 
wood did not violate any building code. (Tr. IV:3425, 3491-93). 
However, Plaintiffs ballyhoo their charge that the building 
permit for the outdoor pavilions was revoked in January, 1987 by 
a building inspector who apparently believed that Board of Health 
approval either was or might be necessary. (Exh. 51, p. 3). In 
fact, there was no Board of Health approval required and 
Plaintiffs conceded there was no health requirement governing 
the crypt construction. (Tr. VIII:4434). There was no testimony 
from the building inspector why he sought to revoke the permit. 
There was no evidence that notice of his "revocation" was ever 
communicated to Garner or his contractor. The trial court 
refused to allow Mr. Evans to explain that the building inspector 
had been in error. (Tr. IV:3490-91). There was no deception 
of any government official. It is very obvious from Exhibit 51 
that the building inspector saw the wood crypts. He was not 
deceived by what he saw. Simply stated, Plaintiffs take 
unjustified license with the facts by filling in their own 
conclusions in the absence of any evidence. 
Plaintiffs suggest sinister conspiracy because the contrac-
tor Mr. Ord had discarded his records of the outdoor crypt 
construction, in 1989 when he moved his office. (Appellees' 
Brief at 8-9). However, no deceptive motive can reasonably be 
attached because at that time Mr. Ord also threw out his personal 
records of all his past jobs. Mr. Ord merely threw away all of 
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his records, plans, drawings, etc. that he had accumulated for 
all the jobs he had completed in the 14 years he had been in 
Utah. It is unfortunate that the records discarded included 
the building of the pavilion crypts. Yet, none of the jobs were 
"current" and Mr. Ord believed he would have no further use or 
need for the records. (Tr. IV:3515, 3554-56). For Plaintiffs 
to accuse Mr. Ord and Defendants of sinister complicity in 
destroying his records is baseless and unjustifiably demeaning. 
PLAINTIFFS' "ARGUMENT" THAT GARNER EXPECTED TO SAVE 
OVER $400f000.00 BY BUILDING WOOD CRYPTS IS SPURIOUS. 
Plaintiffs' contention that Garner sought to save over 
$400,000.00 by building the crypts of wood, rather than concrete, 
may be appealing at first blush but is, in fact, spurious and 
founded upon unsupported guesswork. 
This argument was discussed by Mr. Caldwell, Plaintiffs' 
expert. (Tr. VII:4168-72). His conclusions are summarized in 
Exhibit 89a (Attachment 1 to Brief of Appellees). The first 
problem with Exhibit 89a (and Defendants' argument) is the 
assumption that the 1984 cost to construct outdoor crypts with 
concrete would have been $582,500.00. This sum was assumed by 
Mr. Caldwell based on his interpretation of Exhibit 52. Exhibit 
52 (attached hereto in the Reply Addendum) is a handwritten, 
cryptic note by Mr. Fluckiger wherein he guesstimates what he 
thinks the pavilion crypts might cost, even before the detail 
planning stage. (Tr. VII:4169, 4177-79). 
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Mr. Fluckiger's note was prepared on April 18, 1984, before 
the variance hearing was held, and before any detailed drawings 
were prepared on which the building permit for the pavilions was 
based. Fluckiger estimated that each pavilion shell, without 
any crypts, would cost $40,000.00, or $200,000.00 for the five 
inter-connected pavilions, without interior crypts. The actual 
total cost to build the outdoor pavilions, with crypts, was 
$173,400.00. 
Mr. Fluckiger also estimated, at the bottom of Exhibit 52, 
that a pre-cast concrete crypt might cost $750.00 per crypt, or 
$7 6,500.00 for the 102 crypts in each pavilion. This price 
information on a DUWE pre-cast crypt came from a brochure that 
Mr. Fluckiger had obtained in 1982 when he designed a proposal 
for the second-story addition to the main mausoleum building. 
(Tr. 111:3377-78; IV:3426). 
Exhibit 52 does not explain how this concrete crypt 
pricing relates to any plans for or construction of the outdoor 
pavilions, if at all. Mr. Fluckiger explained that Exhibit 52 
was only "a very preliminary, sketchy analysis" comparing the 
estimated cost of the exterior shell per pavilion ($40,000.00) to 
a 1982 estimate for pre-cast concrete crypts ($7 6,500) that had 
been considered for a proposed second-story addition to the main 
mausoleum. (Tr. 111:3396-98). 
Mr. Caldwell did not hear Mr. Fluckiger's explanation of his 
notations and did not talk to him concerning Exhibit 52. (Tr. 
VII:4170). Mr. Caldwell improperly assumed that pre-cast 
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concrete crypts were intended to be used at the outdoor pavilion. 
That assumption was baseless because there was no evidence to 
support it. Any use of the DUWE crypt system obviated the need 
of any exterior shell, and the concrete crypts actually included 
in the pavilions were poured in place and were not the DUWE 
variety. (Tr. VII:4179). In spite of his flawed assumption, Mr. 
Caldwell opined that the total cost of building the outdoor 
pavilions, with concrete crypts, included the $40,000.00 (per 
pavilion) for an all-reinforced concrete exterior shell, plus the 
cost of the DUWE brand of pre-cast concrete crypts. (Tr. 
VII:4179). We submit that such an opinion, without any factual 
basis, cannot properly be claimed as "factual." 
And, importantly, the record is totally devoid of any 
evidence that Exhibit 52 or Mr. Fluckiger's calculations and 
guesstimates were ever shared with Mr. Garner or ever came to his 
attention. His testimony that he never saw Exhibit 52 was not 
contradicted. (Tr. V:3694, 3696; VII:4179). 
Plaintiffs cannot parlay Mr. Fluckiger's personal and 
private notes into a factual claim that Mr. Garner built wood 
crypts solely for profit. For example, a change in the roof 
design made the pavilions more expensive, not less. (Tr. 
111:3389; IV:3420). There was no evidence as to the relative 
costs of crypts made of poured-in-place concrete versus wood. 
There was no properly-founded evidence to support the contention 
that any cost savings was achieved by using wood. 
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THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE ROUNDHOUSE 
VENTURE WAS A FAILURE
 f AND DEFENDANTS WERE 
PRECLUDED FROM SHOWING THAT IT WAS A SUCCESS. 
Plaintiffs claim at page 12 of their brief that the Arizona 
"Roundhouse venture" was a "failure," and imply that that is the 
reason Ong International got out. In fact, when Defendants 
attempted at trial to show what happened on the Roundhouse 
venture at Pinetop, Arizona, Plaintiffs objected, stating: 
"It's not part of any issues in this case." Consequently, the 
court refused to allow Defendants' testimony concerning the 
profitability of that venture. (Tr. VIII:4350-52). 
THE ELDER HANKS LOAN AND COY MILES STOCK CERTIFICATE, 
The "paper evidencing Miles' share in the corporation" 
(Appellees' Brief at 14) which Mr. Miles insisted that Hanks 
accept as collateral for the $75,000.00 loan, was the stock 
certificate, Exh. 53. (Tr. V:3739; a copy of Exh. 53 is in the 
Reply Addendum). The back side of that stock certificate was 
endorsed by Mr. Miles to Elder Hanks, as Elder Hanks testified at 
trial. (Tr. V:3749). Moreover, Elder Hanks later accepted the 
$75,000.00 paid by 11th Avenue Corporation and then gave the 
mausoleum stock certificate to Mr. Garner. (Tr. V:3747). 
DEFENDANTS NEVER DEPRIVED PLAINTIFFS 
OF PARTNERSHIP RECORDS. 
All partnership records were readily available to Alldredge 
before he signed the Redemption Agreement. (Tr. 111:3248-50, 
3285-86). Alldredge hired independent accountants to audit the 
mausoleum records before finalizing the terms of the Redemption 
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Agreement. That audit resulted in a reduction in the considera-
tion agreed to be paid under the Agreement. (Tr. 11:3055-56). 
To do so, Alldredge had to have access to mausoleum partnership 
records. He could not have computerized the records without 
the necessary information in hard-copy form to allow the 
computerization. 
When Defendants left the mausoleum premises and the 
partnership terminated, Susan Stewart converted all mausoleum 
partnership information stored in the computer to hard-copy form 
for the benefit of Plaintiffs. (Tr. IX:4620-21). 
THERE WAS NO CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT THE 
WOOD CRYPTS WERE NOT DURABLE AND OTHERWISE ADEQUATE. 
Plaintiffs' expert Milne identified structural integrity 
as the first and presumably most important factor in building 
mausolea. (Tr. IV:3573). Milne never testified that the outdoor 
pavilion crypts lacked these qualities, and volunteered that the 
pavilion walls were adequately strong. (Tr. IV:3603). Although 
Milne observed that 2 or 3 out of the 100 crypts he examined had 
a slight bowing of wood panels, he did not know whether the 
bowing was because the panels were not cut to a proper height, or 
some other reason. (Tr. IV:3624-26). Contrary to Plaintiffs' 
assertion that the woods used were "inferior" (Appellants' Brief 
at 19), no witness ever so testified. 
While Milne said that the interior dimensions of some crypts 
were one or two inches short of what he recommended, he knew 
caskets had been placed in the crypts. There was no evidence 
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that a casket would not fit within any crypt. (Tr. IV:3602-3, 
3628). 
Milne admitted that in all of the 541 mausolea he had built, 
he had never built a structure free from defects. (Tr. IV:3623). 
THE EVIDENCE PERTAINING TO CRYPT CUSTOMERS 
IS MISREPRESENTED IN PLAINTIFFS' BRIEF. 
Mr. and Mrs. Cummings did not purchase crypts on the second 
story and were not angry about any transfer to the outdoor 
pavilion, as claimed in Plaintiffs' brief at page 22. On the 
page before that cited in support of this assertion, Sandra 
Lenois admitted she was confused and that she had wrongly 
identified Mr. and Mrs. Cummings on the two prior pages. (Tr. 
VI:3932-35). 
The letter Ms. Lenois sent to Mr. and Mrs. Cummings 
concerning crypts being pre-cast was based on information 
she claimed to have received from Bob Ord, at a time before 
construction on the crypts had begun. (Tr. VI:3935). The 
information was neither shared with Mr. Garner nor provided by 
him. The suggestion that Mr. Garner should have told her to 
discuss differences between the indoor and outdoor crypts is 
merely Plaintiffs' conclusion and is not factually based. (Tr. 
VI:3936-8). 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Plaintiffs presented no evidence that their agreement to the 
release provisions of the Redemption Agreement was other than 
knowing and voluntary. Plaintiffs cannot point to one single 
misrepresentation of the crypts or act of concealment after the 
partnership was formed. The Redemption Agreement was a result, 
not a cause, of the disputes between the parties and, by its 
clear language, was intended to resolve all disputes, whether 
known or unknown. The all-encompassing language was proposed by 
Plaintiffs' attorney and could not have been part of any plan or 
conspiracy to defraud Plaintiffs. The release language should be 
enforced according to its unambiguous terms to bar all of 
Plaintiffs' claims. 
Defendants have established that the trial court erred in 
allowing irrelevant evidence and prejudicial argument regarding 
Mrs. Garner's financial condition during the liability phase of 
the trial. Appellees' brief fails to advance any valid argument 
that the trial court properly allowed the wealth evidence and 
refused to bifurcate the issue of punitive damages. 
Absent enforcement of the release, a retrial is necessary 
because of the prejudicial error resulting from premature 
admission of evidence of Garner's wealth, and the several other 
errors by the trial court below which prevented Defendants from 
obtaining a fair trial before an impartial jury. Defendants' 
objections to these errors were either adequately preserved, or 
are reviewable under the plain error doctrine. 
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The trial court's analysis of the punitive damage award 
was fatally flawed by reliance on an artificially inflated 
restitution award. The punitive award exceeded the guidelines 
of Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exchange, 817 P.2d 789, 802 (Utah 
1991), and cannot stand. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE GENERAL RELEASE PROVISIONS OF THE 
REDEMPTION AGREEMENT SHOULD BE ENFORCED. 
A. Plaintiffs Admit That There Was No Representation 
Congealing The flfrtujre Qf Construstion Qf The Outdoor Pavilion 
Crypts During The Existence Of The Partnership. 
As Plaintiffs admit, "at no time leading up to the 
Redemption Agreement did Garner or anyone else for that matter, 
make any statements to Ong or Alldredge regarding the wood 
construction of the outdoor crypts." (Appellees' Brief at 16). 
In fact, Mr. Alldredge admitted at trial that during the 
partnership Mr. Garner made no statement whatsoever to Alldredge 
or to Ong "about the nature of the crypts in the outdoor 
pavilion, that is to say, their construction or their design." 
(Tr. 11:3050-51). 
As we explained in AppeLlants' brief (14-18, and 35-36), 
Plaintiffs' only evidence of any "fraudulent" misrepresentation 
by Defendants are the statements that Plaintiffs claim Mr. Garner 
made during the tours Garner gave them of the mausoleum premises 
during 1987 and April of 1988, before the final partnership 
agreement of the parties was signed and became effective. There 
is absolutely no evidence of any representation of the outdoor 
crypts thereafter. Neither is there any evidence of any attempt 
by Defendants to conceal the wood nature of the crypts from 
Plaintiffs during the partnership or thereafter. 
More importantly, there was absolutely no evidence that 
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Plaintiffs were tricked in any fashion into signing the 
Redemption Agreement in March of 1989, including its release 
provisions. Plaintiffs merely protest that they still labored 
under some misapprehension that the crypts of the outdoor 
pavilion were built exactly the same as those of the indoor 
mausoleum. (Tr. 11:3001, 3007). Yet, Mr. Alldredge was present 
in October of 1988 when a wood crypt was opened and received 
a coffin. He participated in that activity. (Tr. 111:3287-
3288). Mr. Alldredge had adequate means and opportunity and 
could have inspected the crypts had he chosen to do so. A work 
crew was not "required" to remove and replace marble facia 
and open a crypt. The laborer who installed the marble facia 
testified he did it alone and without significant difficulty. 
(Tr. IV:3468). Alldredge was not prevented from inspecting any 
crypts, and he cannot claim that he was. 
Plaintiffs were not "fraudulently induced" into giving the 
release. The operative language of the release was inserted by 
Plaintiffs' attorney and not Defendants'. (Tr. VIII:4474). 
Whether or not marshalled to Plaintiffs' satisfaction, the 
evidence does not show that Plaintiffs' release of all claims 
was "fraudulently procured." 
B. The Garner Appellants Did Not Owe A Fiduciary Duty To 
Plaintiffs With Regard To The Negotiation And Execution Of The 
Terns Qf Tfre Redemptjpn AgyQ^ment;. 
Plaintiffs contend that Mr. Garner owed a continuing 
fiduciary responsibility to Plaintiffs at all times as to all 
matters, past or present, because Plaintiffs and Garner had 
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joined together as joint venturers on a totally unrelated project 
during at least part of the time Plaintiffs contend the wood 
crypts were misrepresented. They also argue that Mr, Garner was 
a fiduciary to his partners on the mausoleum project when the 
Redemption Agreement was negotiated, (Appellees' Brief at 37). 
These arguments do not bear the weight that Plaintiffs would 
place upon them. 
Partners owe each other a fiduciary duty with regard to 
the business of the partnership which binds them to act for the 
mutual good of the venture. As to non-partnership matters, where 
the partners adversarily deal with each other at arms-length, 
there is no good reason to require any higher duty than that 
existing between relative strangers, in the absence of special 
circumstances which empower one of the parties to exercise 
particular influence or special advantage over the other. First 
Security Bank of Utahf N.A. v. Banberry Development Corp., 7 86 
P.2d 1326, 1333 (Utah 1990). Excluding fiduciary relationships 
which arise from formal legal proceedings or from a contractual 
relationship like that of attorney and client, fiduciary 
responsibilities are not implied in law except where "the 
factual situation surrounding the involved transactions and the 
relationship of the parties to each other and to the questioned 
transactions," so demand. EanberrX/ 786 P.2d at 1332 (emphasis 
added) (quoting Dennison State Bank v. Madeira, 230 Kan. 684, 
691-92, 640 P.2d 1235, 1241 (1982)). 
Once the parties began negotiations to terminate their 
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relationship as partners in 1989, there are two reasons why an 
asserted fiduciary responsibility cannot apply: (1) the several 
actual disputes and concomitant destruction of trust between 
the parties, which occurred no later than November of 1988; and 
(2) the parties negotiated how to completely separate and to 
terminate their relationship and not over how to operate or 
to value their partnership. Either circumstance made them 
adversaries to each other in negotiating the terms of the 
separation. Fravega v. Security Savings & Loan Association, 
192 N.J. Super. 213, 223, 469 A.2d 531, 536 (1983) (The standard 
of utmost good faith between joint venturers logically should 
not extend to transactions "where the relationship between the 
parties is, by nature, adversarial" and each partner can be 
expected to look out for his or her own interests); Walter v. 
Holiday Innsr Inc.r 784 F.Supp. 1159, 1167-68 (D.N.J. 1992), 
appeal pending, No. 92-5114 (3rd Cir. 1992) (A corporate partner 
had no duty to disclose forecasts of the projected value of the 
partnership to co-partner plaintiffs selling their partnership 
interests to defendants). Whatever "duty" existed before was 
gone after Plaintiffs' and Defendants' relationship became 
estranged and adversarial. Id. 
More importantly, any partnership information was reasonably 
accessible to Plaintiffs. Even if a fiduciary obligation of 
disclosure were not abated by the adversarial posture of the 
parties, Defendants still are entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law because: 
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It is a recognized exception to the common law duty 
of full disclosure in partnership law that a partner 
satisfies his fiduciary obligations if he makes all 
information regarding the business of the partnership 
available to his co-partners. [Citing, among other 
authorities, Burke v. Farrell, 656 P.2d 1015 (Utah 
1982), and Vestal, "'Ask Me No Questions and I'll Tell 
You No Lies: Statutory and Common-Law Disclosure 
Requirements Within High-Tech Joint Ventures'," 65 
Tulane Law Rev. 705, 727-35 (1991).] 
Walter v. Holiday Innsr Inc.,, 784 F.Supp. at 1171. Here, there 
is no evidence that Plaintiff Alldredge, who had officed at the 
mausoleum for over eight months, was in any way prevented from 
making any inspection or inquiry he wanted, including opening 
any crypt to see its construction. He had access to corporate 
records. (Tr. 111:3249-50, 3285-86). And, it cannot be ignored 
that Garner invited Alldredge* to assist at an entombment in a 
wood crypt where the wood was plainly visible, but Alldredge 
claims he failed to notice that fact. 
C. Defendants' Authorities Support Enforcement Of The 
Release Provisions. 
Plaintiffs attempt to confuse the issue argu€*d in Point I 
of Appellants' brief by setting up the straw argument that 
Appellants claimed these authorities were on "all fours" with the 
present case. We submit that a fair and reasonable reading of 
Defendants' authorities show that they are not "airballs," but 
rather "fair" balls. Defendants' authorities accurately 
represent and support the law for which they were cited in 
Appellants' brief. We do not claim that these cases represent 
more, and Plaintiffs may not denigrate them as being less, than 
they state. 
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More importantly, Plaintiffs' effort to distinguish Ingram 
Corp, v. J. Ray McDermott & Companyf Inc.f 698 F.2d 1295 (5th 
Cir. 1983), cannot survive scrutiny. Financially strained, 
Ingram Corp. entered into a series of contracts with McDermott, 
its largest competitor, whereby McDermott paid approximately $42 
million to acquire Ingram's assets. By February 1972, various 
disputes began to arise pertaining to the contracts between them. 
The disputes touched a wide variety of legal and factual matters, 
resulting in protracted settlement negotiations between the 
parties and their counsel. In May 1973, Ingram Corp. and 
McDermott Company agreed to a complete settlement upon Ingram's 
payment of $1.2 million to McDermott. As part of that settlement 
agreement, the parties agreed to a comprehensive, mutual release 
of all claims. 
Over five years later, Ingram sued McDermott for antitrust 
and RICO violations. McDermott defended based on the release. 
As in this case, Ingram argued that the release had been procured 
by fraud because McDermott had not disclosed its prior antitrust 
conduct. UL. at 1298-1302. 
The Fifth Circuit Court held, as a matter of law, that the 
district court erred in refusing to enforce the general releases 
in favor of McDermott. That court found that any nexus between 
McDermott's alleged misrepresentations and attempt to hide its 
antitrust conduct, and the later release negotiations was 
"far too attenuated to be of probative value." Id. at 1315. 
McDermott's "silence as to possible antitrust claims is not the 
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same thing as fraudulent inducement," Id. Finally, the court 
held that the releases were c{ result/ not a cause, of the sale of 
Ingram's assets to McDermott and were therefore not "part and 
parcel" of any antitrust conspiracy. Id. 
The parallels between the Ingram case and the present matter 
are striking and unavoidable. 
First, there was a sale of "assets" to Plaintiffs. Plain-
tiffs argue that that sale (e.g. partnership) would not have 
occurred absent the alleged misrepresentations, which are 
comparable to the antitrust violations of McDermott. Soon after 
the contract was entered into (here the Partnership Agreement), 
disputes arose between the parties touching a wide variety of 
issues. Those disputes led to a loss of whatever trust may have 
existed between the parties. 
Each party was represented by separate legal counsel to 
negotiate a resolution of th€>ir disputes. Like the McDermott 
Company, Mr. Garner accepted the Plaintiffs' settlement offer to 
buy out his interest in the partnership for approximately 
one-half of its agreed value less than a year before. 
Releases were given as part of the parties' settlement 
agreement (i.e. the Redemption Agreement). Later, the alleged 
fraud as to events occurring prior to the original partnership 
comes to light. In both cases, the party crying "fraud" paid 
cash or its equivalent to the other as part of the settlement and 
release. 
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The release of unknown claims is just as viable here as in 
Ingram. The release could not have been and was not part or 
parcel of any conspiracy. The release provision was proposed 
by Plaintiffs' attorney because Plaintiffs voluntarily sought a 
complete and final separation from Mr. Garner. 
Any silence by Defendants about the nature of construction 
of the outdoor crypts did not cause Plaintiffs to sign the 
release. It is not enough for Plaintiffs to say that they might 
never have signed the release had they known. Any possible nexus 
between any earlier misrepresentations and the negotiated release 
is too attenuated and lacks probative value. 
As for Plaintiffs' "intent" argument, the release language 
is clear and unambiguous. Plaintiffs' intent is not at issue, as 
both parties' "intent" should be interpreted from the contract's 
own language, plateau Mining Company vt Utah Division of State 
Lands and Forestry, 802 P.2d 720, 725 (Utah 1990); accord Barnett 
v. Buchan Baking Company, 45 Wash.App. 152, 724 P.2d 1077, 1081 
(1986), aff'd 108 Wash.2d 405, 738 P.2d 1056 (1987). The court 
should enforce the outward expression of the agreement, rather 
than a party's unexpressed intention. Winet v. Price, 4 Cal. 
App. 4th 1159, 6 Cal. Rptr. 554, 558 (1992). Even so, Exhibit 
183 effectively belies Plaintiffs' later self-serving 
protestations. 
Plaintiffs knew they were signing a comprehensive release 
and intended that release to extend to any and all unknown 
claims. (Exh. 183). Neither Plaintiffs nor their counsel sought 
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to carve out any exception for fraud claims at the time they 
insisted upon the all-encompassing language. 
The purpose of a release is to settle disputes. The policy 
favoring enforcement of releases, knowingly and voluntarily 
signed, is wise and prudent. To excuse Plaintiffs contravenes 
the sanctity of contract terms knowingly proposed and accepted. 
Plaintiffs may not have known every claim they had but they knew 
they were giving up and releasing all claims, known and unknown. 
If a mutual release of unknown claims has any efficacy at all in 
modern jurisprudence, it must be enforced in this case. Where 
Plaintiffs specifically offered and agreed to release unknown 
claims, that intent, clearly expressed in their agreement, cannot 
now be opened up for reconsideration when they were not coerced, 
deceived or "fraudulently induced" to sign the release. 
Accordingly, the release* provisions of the Redemption 
Agreement should be enforced as written to bar all of Plaintiffs' 
claims. The judgment should be reversed and entered in favor of 
Defendants. 
D, Plaintiffs' Authority That The Release Is Unenforceable 
Is Easily Distinguished. 
The centerpiece of Plaintiffs' legal argument against the 
enforceability of the releases is Lamb v. Bangartf 525 P. 2d 602 
(Utah 1974), a case of alleged fraud in the sale of cattle. 
There was T\Q written release and settlement agreement of any kind 
involved in that case. Plaintiffs Lamb claimed that the breeding 
status and lineage of certain cattle had been misrepresented 
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before execution of a sales contract, the only written agreement 
between the parties. Bangarts responded that a remedy provision 
in the sale contract required Bangarts to share one-half of 
their 1,500 ampules of semen with Lambs and that this was the 
plaintiffs' exclusive remedy under the contract. That limited 
contractual remedy failed in its essential purpose because 
Bangarts misrepresented the quantity of semen on hand. The 
remedy provision was not enforceable by Bangarts. 
Plaintiffs Alldredge and Ong rely on the L&mk dictum that a 
covenant of immunity will not protect a person against his own 
fraud; and, "A contract limitation on damages or remedies is 
valid only in the absence of allegations or proof of fraud.'' 
Lambr 525 P.2d at 608. While this argument may well apply in 
its proper context, neither the quote nor the case apply to the 
present dispute where each party had many claims against and 
disputes with the other, and mutually agreed to settle and 
release all prior existing claims, known and unknown. Lamb v. 
Bangart is so far removed from the facts and law in this case 
that the suggestion that the opinion is controlling in the 
present dispute is meritless. 
II. 
PLAINTIFFS WERE NOT ENTITLED TO REFER TO OR 
SUBMIT EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANTS' FINANCIAL 
CONDITION BEFORE A JURY FINDING OF LIABILITY. 
Appellees' Brief does not respond to the persuasive 
substance of Garner's arguments that due process, fairness and 
the provisions of Utah Code Ann. Section 78-18-1(2) (1992) 
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required the trial court to exclude any reference to Defendants' 
financial condition during the liability and damage phase of the 
trial. Instead, without any support from the record, Plaintiffs 
captiously argue that the issue was waived prior to Defendants' 
pretrial Second Motion in Limine (attached hereto in Reply 
Addendum). 
Appellees' diffused hyperbole is intended to distract this 
Court from addressing the significant and compelling logic of 
Appellants' brief. Indeed, what better way to confuse and 
distract the jury from the facts and merits of the case than to 
continually hype that Mr. Garner is worth multi-millions in net 
assets and can afford to give them to Appellees? Schwartz, 
"Challenging the Constitutionality of Punitive Damages: Putting 
Rules of Reason on an Unbounded Legal Remedy," 28 Amer. Bus. L.J. 
485, 489 (Fall 1990). 
Any attempt in this case to justify the trial court's 
admission of wealth evidence in order to determine the punitive 
damages at best comprises a "multiplicity of vague, overlapping 
terms" that are inconsistently applied, due in part, to the 
jury's wide, unfettered discretion. The result "allows little 
reason to believe that only deserving defendants are punished 
or that actors have fair notice of the consequences of their 
conduct." Evidence of Defendants' financial condition only 
enhances the "bias and redistributive inclinations of juries 
which predictably influence outcomes . . .." See Ellis, 
"Punitive Damages, Due Process, and The Juries," 4 0 Ala. L. Rev. 
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975, 979 (1989). 
Any legitimate purpose of punitive damages was not furthered 
in this case by the evidence and commentary on Mr. Garner's 
finances. Under Plaintiffs' approach that "all's fair", perverse 
incentives are created. 
Uncertain criteria for determining the amount of an 
assessment magnify the unfairness resulting from the 
vagueness and variety of the liability criteria, invite 
juries to indulge their biases and penchant for wealth 
redistribution, and induce plaintiffs . . . to seek 
punitive damages from defendants with "deep pockets" 
rather than morally guilty persons. 
Id.; See also, Ellis, "Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of 
Punitive Damages," 56 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1, 61-63 (1982). To be 
accorded a fair determination of liability and compensatory 
damages, Garner should have received a trial of these issues 
separate from any punitive considerations. 40 Ala. L. Rev. at 
1003; See also the A.B.A. Report, Amer. Bar Assoc. Commission 
to Improve the Tort Liability System: Report to the House of 
Delegates, pp. 18-19 (Feb. 1987). 
This Court recognized that the lack of standards in punitive 
damage determinations is a fundamental problem. Crookston v. 
Fire Ins. Exchange, 817 P.2d 789, 802 (Utah 1991). Unlike 
Appellees here, we do not view this Court's decision in Crookston 
as a final placebo to all the vagaries and deficiencies long 
perpetuated by exemplary damage awards. The issues presented to 
the Court today in this case were not argued, discussed or 
decided in Crookston. The Court is now provided an opportunity 
for "further development" (Id. at 813) by recognizing Defendants' 
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right to a fair determination of any liability untainted by a 
jury's bias for or against irrelevant wealth. 
As specifically demonstrated in Appellants' Brief (pp. 42-
55), Plaintiffs were permitted to aggressively bombard the jury 
with evidence and argument of Mr. Garner's wealth. Defendants 
did not "put wealth in issue." Plaintiffs' record citations do 
not support their attempt to shift responsibility for this 
maneuver. Defendants' in limine motion to preclude all such 
references was denied. Plaintiffs introduced and perpetuated 
the issue, beginning with their opening statement that "Mr. 
Garner . . . is a multimillionaire, has a net worth of over—way 
over seven million dollars, and we [Plaintiffs] will ask you, the 
jury, for a finding that there ought to be exemplary punitive 
damages . . .." (Tr. 1:2919; see also Tr. V:3712-16). The issue 
of Mr. Garner's wealth, regardless of its evidentiary source, was 
presented and perpetuated by Plaintiffs, not by Defendants. 
The pettiness of Plaintiffs' excuses is exampled by the 
admission of Mrs. Garner's tax information with Mr. Garner's. 
(Appellees' Brief at 68). Plaintiffs excuse this irrelevant, 
prejudicial evidence because the trial judge told Garner that he 
had had several months' "notice" prior to trial to voluntarily 
separate the tax information for the Plaintiffs. (Tr. VII:4232-
36). Such reasoning makes as much sense as telling Defendants 
that they are responsible for the admissibility of Plaintiffs' 
evidence. Defendants did not have the burden to assure that 
Plaintiffs' exhibits or evidence were relevant and admissible. 
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Whatever excuse Plaintiffs ascribe to the evidence of Mrs. 
Garner's wealth is wholly without merit. The trial court's 
ruling was unjustifiable and is a further example of the court's 
abuse of Defendants during the trial proceedings. And, see 
Chamberlain vf Cherry, 818 S.W. 2d 201, 206 (Tex. App. 1991) (a 
tax return shows only current income and not a defendant's 
general wealth or present financial condition). 
Plaintiffs vainly dismiss Defendants' argument on punitive 
damages with the same &d hominem tactic employed at trial — in 
essence, that unrestricted wealth evidence "has long been the 
practice in Utah" and Defendants do not have any Utah case that 
says Plaintiffs cannot. (Appellees' Brief at 49-50). Whether 
or not Utah juries have ever properly heard evidence of a 
defendant's wealth at the same time as it considered the issues 
of liability and compensatory damages is not a matter of record 
in this case. There is no. Utah authority that has ever 
considered or countenanced such a procedure. This issue of 
first impression allows this Court to correct past vagaries and 
remedy perpetuated errors of bygone trial procedures. The 
argument that because of past practice, fairness, due process, 
and Section 78-18-1(2) are as dross makes as much sense here as 
to perpetuate a deadman's statute, guest statute, a statute of 
repose, or even the old rules of code pleading for the same 
reason. 
Plaintiffs criticize Defendants for raising "new arguments 
on appeal that were not argued below." (Appellees' Brief at 47, 
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n. 21; 49, n. 24). Plaintiffs mistakenly attempt to equate 
"issues" with "arguments." Prior to trialf Defendants filed 
their "Second Motion in Limine" (Reply Add., R. 2:845-47) to 
preclude any evidence or reference to the relative wealth and 
financial condition of any party until after a determination of 
liability. In their supporting memorandum, Defendants argued 
that such references and evidence were irrelevant, prejudicial 
and in contravention of Utah Code Ann. Section 78-18-1(2) (1992). 
The same issues were again placed before the trial judge in 
Defendants' motion for new trial and/or remittitur of damages. 
(Post Verdict Motion, R. 5:1920-22). 
The issue of the prejudicial admission of wealth evidence 
before any determination of liability was clearly and properly 
raised and preserved below. Defendants submit that their further 
arguments on appeal in support of this same issue are appropriate 
and compelling. An appellant is not limited merely to the 
precise argument made below. Yee v. City of Escondido, 112 S. 
Ct. 1522, 1532 (1992). Such a miserly approach denigrates the 
value of appellate review. 
Plaintiffs also excuse the lower court's error by asserting 
an alleged waiver of the issue dehors the record. (Appellees' 
Brief at 48-50). We observe that Plaintiffs do not provide any 
record support for their claim because there is none. Nowhere in 
the record did Defendants ever "agree" that Section 78-18-1(2) 
does not apply to this case. And, we affirmatively reject 
Plaintiffs' misguided perception of any extra-record matter. 
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If, as Plaintiffs claim, there was some "agreement" before 
Defendants' Second Motion in Limine, Plaintiffs surely would have 
so argued in their responsive memoranda before the trial court. 
No such contention has ever been made by Plaintiffs until now. 
This new "waiver" claim was never made below. (Plffs' Memo, in 
Oppos., R. 3:1263-68; Ong's Answering Memo., R. 6:2201-2). There 
is no merit to it. 
We submit that the considered and persuasive decisions of 
the respected courts of other states, Campen v. Stoner 635 P.2d 
1121 (Wyo. 1981) and Rupert v. Sellers, 48 A.D. 2d 265, 368 
N.Y. S.2d 904 (1975), remain untouched by Plaintiffs. Neither 
have Plaintiffs even attempted to address the considerable 
deficiencies of the trial court's intermingling of liability 
and wealth evidence. 
The concerns and deficiencies discussed by these courts and 
by legal scholars are significant. Plaintiffs have no cogent 
response thereto. Defendants' authorities and arguments in 
Appellants' Brief at 41-55, remain unrefuted. The public policy, 
rationale, and legislative intent behind Section 78-18-1(2) 
are clear. This Court should not adopt an awkward stance in 
direct contravention of the purpose and merits of the statute. 
Whitehead v. American Motors Sales Corp., 801 P.2d 920, 928 (Utah 
1990). 
There was absolutely no need for the jury to know anything 
about Defendants' alleged wealth during the trial of the issues 
of liability and damages. Such evidence and references were, and 
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aref irrelevant and prejudicial. The repeated references to and 
evidence of wealth is reversible error. Whether by exercise of 
its own inherent power to control the trial and assure fairness 
to all parties, or by statutory application, the trial court 
should have bifurcated the trial and excluded evidence of 
Defendants' wealth during the liability phase of the case. Cf. 
State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 499 (Utah 1988). As a matter of 
law, this Court should reverse the trial courts' ruling for its 
refusal to do so. 
III. 
THE GARNER DEFENDANTS DID NOT WAIVE THEIR RIGHT 
TO APPEAL THE CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGE AWARD. 
Plaintiffs argue that Defendants waived their right to 
contest an award of compensatory damages. (Appellees' Brief at 
51). That argument misconstrues both the record and the law. 
When Plaintiffs started examining their expert accountant 
about Exhibits 89 and 90, Defendants did not stipulate to the 
admission of Exhibits 89 and 90, purporting to explain their 
damages, but only that the expert witness would testify to the 
numbers thereon. Defendants did agree that Plaintiffs must lay 
a foundation for those exhibits through the testimony of their 
expert accountant, but would be allowed to show the exhibits 
to the jury during the examination. (Tr. VII:4138-39). Near 
the end of Plaintiffs' direct examination concerning those 
exhibits, Defendants objected for lack of proper foundation 
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and for speculation, and moved to strike the testimony, (Tr. 
VII:4167-70). 
Later in his testimony, Plaintiffs' expert admitted that 
a prejudgment interest factor was added only at the direction 
of Plaintiffs' attorney and not by the experts' independent 
judgment. He had never read the statute or interpreting cases 
to even consider whether that factor was appropriate. (Tr. 
VII:4173-74). And, we submit, any amount for an investment 
rate of return, or consequential damages, was based only on 
Plaintiffs' subjective expectations and not upon any objective, 
credible evidence. (Tr. VII:4219-23). 
Finally, Defendants also moved for a directed verdict on the 
issue of prejudgment interest, particularly under the rescission 
claim, citing Canyon Country Store v. Bracey, 781 P.2d 414 (Utah 
1989). In connection therewith, Defendants also excepted to the 
jury instruction that allowed the jury to include a rate of 
return. (Tr. X:4719; see proposed Instr. 29, final Instr. 48; 
R. 5:1848). 
The jury verdict form did not define the term "consequential 
damages," but relied on instruction 48 to inform the jury what 
the term meant. Defendants' objection to the instruction was all 
that was necessary to preserve this issue for appeal. Plain-
tiffs' cited authorities are inapposite. (Appellants' Brief at 
51). 
Also, contrary to Plaintiffs' contention (Appellees' Brief 
at 60) that Ong International was required to "pour operating 
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capital" money into the mausoleum, the record is entirely devoid 
of any suggestion that Plaintiff Ong was so required. The record 
does evidence that Ong International spent substantial sums, both 
before and after Plaintiffs claim they discovered the wood 
crypts, for which Plaintiffs did not obtain any significant 
return because of their poor management decisions resulting in a 
substantial net loss in 1989 and 1990. (e.g. Exh. 47; Tr. 
IX:4522). These expenditures and Plaintiffs' loss were not a 
"consequence" of any representations by Mr. Garner and were 
unrelated to the physical condition of any crypts. Even if 
Defendants are held liable, the jury improperly rewarded 
Plaintiffs for their own mismanagement. 
IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S INAPPROPRIATE COMMENTS 
DURING TRIALf IDENTIFIED IN PLAINTIFFS' OPENING 
BRIEF, ARE REVIEWABLE AS PLAIN ERROR. 
Plaintiffs contend, at pages 64-65 of their brief, that 
Defendants waived any objection to the court's gratuitous and 
disparaging remarks described in Point III.B.2. of Appellants' 
Brief, at pp. 63-65, 68-69. Defendants respectfully submit that 
those matters are reviewable under the doctrine of ''plain error." 
"Nothing in this rule precludes taking notice of plain errors 
affecting substantial rights although they were not brought to 
the attention of the court." Utah Rule of Evidence 103(d). 
As explained in State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29 (Utah 1989), 
(1) the error needs to be sufficiently plain that the appellate 
court "must be able to say that it should have been obvious to a 
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trial court that it was committing error;" and (2) "the error [in 
this case the cumulative errors] affects the substantial rights 
of the accused, i.e., that the error be harmful." Id. at 35 
(citations omitted). The degree of objective obviousness 
necessary to invoke the plain error rule varies inversely with 
the degree of harm. Id. at 36, n. 11. 
In this case, everyone agrees that the evidence was sharply 
contrasting and critically divided as to whether Garner 
misrepresented the construction of the outdoor crypts. Either 
Garner did not misrepresent that matter (as he, Burtis Evans and 
Susan Stewart testified), or he did (as David Alldredge and Ong 
Ka Thai testified). Credibility was, and is, crucial. Thus, 
anything said or done by the trial judge that reasonably could 
be perceived by a juror to express the judge's opinion on 
credibility matters would receive greater significance. The 
court's frequent commentary tipped the scales against the 
prejudiced party, notwithstanding a brief stock instruction, 
buried in the pile, that the jury determines the credibility of 
witnesses. Such a stock instruction was neither prophylactic 
nor curative, especially coming at the end of the case after the 
jurors had solidified their impressions of the witnesses and 
evidence. 
We submit that the trial judge knew at the outset that the 
evidence was hotly contested and that anything affecting 
credibility could be both critical and outcome-determinative. 
Against this background, Defendants submit that the court's 
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several unsolicited comments satisfy the "obviousness" portion of 
the plain error test. 
With regard to the second prong of that test, that the error 
affect "substantial rights," the court's erroneous rulings and 
comments on credibility resulted in a multi-million dollar 
judgment - a substantial impact on Defendants' rights. Jurors 
are quick to attend a judge's interruption and attach importance 
and meaning never intended. State v. Jackson, 83 Wash. 514, 523, 
145 P. 470, 473-74 (1915) . 
Between the contrary winds of advocacy, a juror would 
not be a man if he did not, in some of the distractions 
of mind which attend a hard-fought and doubtful case, 
grasp the words and manner of the judge as a guide to 
lead him out of his perplexity. On the other hand, a 
presiding judge has no way to measure the effect of his 
interruption. The very fact that he takes a witness 
away from the attorney for examination may, in the 
tense atmosphere of the trial, lead to great prejudice. 
id. Accord, ggede-NjgsQn v, Crystal Mountain, Inci^ 606 p.2d 
1214, 1223 (Wash. 1980). 
Unsolicited comments from the trial court suggested that 
Defendants may have attempted to defraud the Internal Revenue 
Service. (Tr. V:3700). Such a comment is clearly prejudicial 
and satisfies the requirements of plain error. Likewise, we 
submit that the court's harsh criticisms of witnesses Garner and 
Dr. Burtis Evans exceeded reasonable propriety and judicial 
demeanor by unnecessarily lecturing them on their testimony. We 
contend that the court's attitude and prominence suggested to the 
jurors that the witnesses were inherently not credible. 
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Finally, the trial court inappropriately demeaned 
Defendants' expert, Professor Schroeder, by suggesting that Dr. 
Schroeder was trying to show that Plaintiffs "got a bargain," 
thereby signaling to jurors that the professor was not to be 
trusted. 
In short, these unsolicited judicial comments were harmful 
and were reasonably likely to have influenced the jury's 
perceptions and result. These errors are entitled to be reviewed 
along with the other assignments of error identified by 
Defendants at pages 61-71 of their brief. 
[T]he test used for determining an error's harmfulness 
is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that absent 
the error a different result would have occurred. This 
determination should be made on the basis of the record 
as a whole. In the instant case, the determination is 
best made by viewing this error in conjunction with 
other errors which occurred during the trial . . ..") 
[footnote omitted]. 
State v. Emmettr 184 Ut.Adv.Rep. 34, 35 (Utah 1992). As in 
Emmettf the trial court's errors here impacted the Defendants' 
credibility and character, which were at the heart of their 
defense, and resulted in a reasonable likelihood of a different 
result absent the assigned errors. The same reasoning requires a 
similar result in the present case. 
The comments of the trial court here complained of could not 
have been reasonably anticipated. Any objection at the time 
would have been futile. Continual objections would not have 
further alerted the trial court to what it had already just said, 
and would only have further cemented in the minds of the jurors 
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the content and prejudicial nature of the court's comment. 
Nothing goes further to disturb the proper trial atmosphere than 
reiterated insistence upon a position contrary to the judge's 
pronounced views, Cf t Keen v. Overseas Tankship Corp., 194 F.2d 
515, 519 (2nd Cir.), cert, den. 343 U.S. 966 (1952). 
V. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S COLLECTIVE AND 
CUMULATIVE ERRORS REQUIRE A NEW TRIAL. 
The accumulation of error requires retrial even when no 
single error alone would so mandate, where "the cumulative effect 
of the several errors undermines our confidence that defendants 
were able to present to the jury their theory of the case and 
that a fair trial was had." Whitehead yf American MQtpy Sales 
Corp.f 801 P.2d 920, 928 (Utah 1990). The court's reasoning in 
Whitehead is instructive because of its similarity to Defendants' 
problems here: 
In the instant case, the trial court erroneously 
excluded evidence offered by defendants. That evidence 
was necessary to rebut the assertions that plaintiffs 
made to establish liability. This error was compounded 
by unduly restricting the scope of defendants' cross-
examination. Given the conflicting testimony presented 
on this key issue, we cannot say that the substantial 
rights of defendants were not affected by the combined 
effects of the erroneous exclusion of the evidence and 
the limitation of cross-examination. 
Id. at 928. 
Similarly, as detailed in Appellants' brief, the trial court 
here erroneously excluded important testimony of Dr. Schroeder 
which went to the materiality of the crypts having been built 
of wood. That evidence was necessary to rebut the assertions 
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Plaintiffs made concerning the contended inadequacy of the wood 
crypts to establish Defendants' liability. 
The court's unduly restrictive rulings prohibited Defendants 
from adequately exploring the bias of Steve Nielson and Sandra 
Lenois. The trial judge's disparaging comments during the 
testimony of witnesses Keith Garner, Robert Ord, Dr. Herbert 
Schroeder, Dr. Larry Reaveley, and Dr. Burtis Evans, all as 
explained in Appellants' Brief at 61-71, undermined the 
reliability of the jury's verdict. Given the conflicting 
testimony, credibility was critical to the jury's consideration 
of the evidence and was compromised by the trial judge's partisan 
approach. The combined effect of the erroneous exclusion of 
evidence and the limitation of examination requires reversal and 
remand for a new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
The issues in this appeal challenge the trial court's 
rulings as matters of law - and not facts. Extensive 
"marshaling" of all of the trial evidence is not required to 
establish the reversible errors below. Even so, Plaintiffs' 
"marshaled facts" are unreliable and should be disregarded. 
There was no evidence in the record of any fraudulent 
inducement or procurement of the Redemption Agreement with its 
release provisions. Those release provisions, inserted by 
Plaintiffs' attorney and negotiated at arms-length, are clear and 
comprehensive and should be enforced to bar all of Plaintiffs' 
claims. The judgments entered below should be vacated and 
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reversed, with an instruction to the trial court to dismiss all 
of Plaintiffs' claims with prejudice. 
Absent outright dismissal, the case should be remanded for 
a new trial, bifurcating trial of the issues of liability and 
compensatory damages from Plaintiffs' claim for punitive damages. 
The trial court's refusal to bifurcate and the numerous other 
errors in the aggregate solidly cement Defendants' entitlement to 
a new trial, as a matter of Law. 
Respectfully submitted this day of July, 1992. 
/" . 
Arthur H. Nielsen 
John K. Mangum 
of NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C. 
(A 
Uark R. Nielser 
ofSHENRIOD, HENRIOD & NIELSEN 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellants 
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Arthur H. Nielsen, USB No. A2405 
Gary A. Weston, USB No. 3435 
John K. Mangum, USB No. 2072 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Suite 1100, Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1900 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ONG INTERNATIONAL (U.S.A.) ) 
INC., a Nevada corporation; 
D&D MANAGEMENT, a Utah ) DEFENDANTS1 SECOND MOTION 
corporation; and DAVID L.' IN LIMINE 
ALLDREDGE, an individual, ) 
Plaintiffs, ) 
v« ) 
11TH AVENUE CORPORATION, a Btah ) 
corporation, f/k/a Salt Lake 
Memorial Mausoleum; and ) Civil No. 900904288CN 
KEITH E. GARNER, an individual, 
) Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
Defendants. 
Defendants move the Court for an order with regard to the 
trial of this case: 
1. Prohibiting the offer of evidence of relative wealth 
and financial condition or circumstance of any party unless and 
until the Court has received a preliminary finding from the jury 
that punitive damages should be awarded or said evidence is 
relevant to a claim or defense other than for punitive damages. 
13522 
C00845 
2. Precluding opening statements to the jury from 
disclosing, addressing or making reference to the finances, 
financial statements, investments and businesses, and any other 
condition or circumstance of the relative wealth of a party, 
which disclosure or reference is made relative to a claim for 
punitive damages or which would otherwise be precluded by the 
Court absent a claim for punitive damages against that party. 
3. Determining that the Court, in its charge to the jury, 
shall not disclose that a portion of any punitive damages awarded 
in the case may be remitted to the State Treasurer for deposit 
into the General Fund as provided by §78-18-1(3), Utah Code Ann. 
4. Excluding the 'opinion or conclusion of any expert 
witness with regard to the market for the sale of wood crypts, 
the ability to sell wood crypts, and/or the conditions and 
circumstances necessary to market wood crypts or the effect that 
wood crypts in the Salt Lake Memorial Mausoleum may have on 
marketing of concrete crypts therein, except where sufficient 
foundation is preliminarily laid establishing that said expert 
witness has offered and marketed wood crypts for sale, attempted 
to so offer and market, or has made a sufficient study or 
investigation of the marketability of wood crypts, or has 
reasonably relied upon such a study or investigation in arriving 
at such opinion or conclusion. 
Defendants herewith submit their memorandum of points and 
authorities. 
13522 - 2 -
C00846 
DATED this 31st day of July, 1991. 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
Defendants 
Suite7 1100
 r Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 5 32-1900 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 31st day of July, 1991, I 
served the foregoing DEFENDANTS' SECOND MOTION IN LIMINE by 
causing a true and correct copy thereof to be personally 
delivered to the following: 
Robert S. Campbell, Jr., Esq. 
Clark W. Sessions, Esq. 
Dean C. Andreasen, Esq. 
CAMPBELL, MAACK & SESSIONS 
170 South Main Street, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
Courtesy Copy: 
Hon. J. Dennis Frederick 
Third Judicial District Court 
240 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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